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Trump and Iran

Donald Trump’s election as President guarantees that America’s Middle East policy will change.  The real question, though, and a major early test for Trump, is whether it will change enough.  Does he understand that the region’s geopolitics differ dramatically from when he left office, and could change even more before Inauguration Day?  The early signs are not promising that Trump grasps either the new strategic opportunities or threats Washington and its allies face.

The region’s central crisis on January 20 will be Iran’s ongoing “ring of fire” strategy against Israel.  Right now, Israel is systematically dismantling Hamas’s political leadership, military capabilities, and underground Gaza fortress.  Israel is similarly dismembering Hezbollah in Lebanon:  its leadership annihilated, its enormous missile arsenal steadily decimated, and its hiding places shattered.  Israel will continue degrading Hamas, Hezbollah, and West Bank terrorists, ultimately eliminating these pillars of Iranian power.  Even President Biden’s team has already urged Qatar to expel Hamas’s leaders(https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/politics/qatar-hamas-doha-us-request/index.html).

Unfortunately, Yemen’s Houthis, still blocking the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage, have suffered only limited damage, as have Iran’s Shia militia proxies in Syria and Iraq.  Iran itself finally faced measurable retaliation on October 26, as Israel eliminated the Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and inflicted substantial damage on missile-production facilities.  Nonetheless, Iran’s direct losses remain minimal.  Due to intense White House pressure and the impending US elections, Jerusalem targeted neither Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program nor its oil infrastructure.

Whether Israel takes further significant action before January 20 is the biggest unknown variable.  Israel’s October 26 air strikes have prompted unceasing boasting from Tehran that it will retaliate in turn.  These boasts remain unfulfilled.  The ayatollahs appear so fearful of Israel’s military capabilities that they hope the world’s attentions drift away as Iran backs down in the face of Israel’s threat.  If, however, Iran does summon the will to retaliate, it is nearly certain this time that Israel’s counterstrike will be devastating, especially if during the US presidential transition.  Israeli Defense Forces could lay waste to Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs so extensively they rock the foundations of the ayatollahs’ regime.

Washington’s conventional wisdom is that Trump will return to “maximum pressure” economically against Iran through more and better-enforced sanctions, and stronger, more consistent support for Israel, as during his first term.  If so, Tehran’s mullahs can relax.  Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” policy was nothing of the sort.  Even worse, a Trump surrogate has already announced that the incoming administration will have “no interest in regime change in Iran(https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-envoy-says-trump-aims-to-weaken-iran-deal-of-the-century-likely-back-on-table/),” implying that the fantasy still lives that Trump could reach a comprehensive deal with Tehran in his second term.

Moreover, despite the staged good will in Bibi Netanyahu’s call to Trump last week, their personal relationship is tense.  Trump said in 2021, “the first person that congratulated [Biden] was Bibi Netanyahu, the man that I did more for than any other person I dealt with.  Bibi could have stayed quiet. He has made a terrible mistake(https://www.axios.com/2021/12/10/trump-netanyahu-disloyalty-fuck-him).”  In practice, this means that Israel should not expect the level of Trump support it received previously.  And, because Trump is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, he need not fear negative domestic political reactions if he opposes Israel on important issues.

Much depends on the currently unclear circumstances Trump will face on January 20.  In addition to shunning regime change, Trump seems mainly interested in simply ending the conflict promptly, apparently without regard to how(https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-erratic-foreign-policy-meet-a-world-fire-2024-11-06/), which has proven very effective in US politics.  This approach is consistent with his position on Ukraine.  Asserting that neither conflict would have even occurred had he remained President, which is neither provable nor disprovable, Trump sees these wars as unwanted legacies from Biden.

If Israel does not demolish Iran’s nuclear aspirations before Trump’s inauguration, those aspirations will be the first and most pressing issue he faces.  If he simply defaults back to “maximum pressure” through sanctions, he is again merely postponing an ultimate reckoning with Iran.  Even restoring the sanctions to the levels prevailing when Trump left the Oval Office will be difficult, because Biden’s flawed and ineffective sanctions-enforcement efforts have weakened compliance globally.  Trump will not likely have the attention span or the resolve to toughen sanctions back to meaningful levels.  The growing cooperation among Russia, China and Iran means Iran’s partners will do all they can to break the West’s sanctions, as they are breaking the West’s Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia.

As they say in Texas, Trump is typically “all hat and no cattle”:  he talks tough but doesn’t follow through on his rhetoric.  Since he has never shown any inclination to move decisively against Iran’s nuclear program, that leaves the decision to Israel, which has its own complex domestic political problems to resolve.  An alternative is to assist Iran’s people to overthrow Tehran’s hated regime.  Here, too, however, Trump has shown little interest, thereby missing rare opportunities that Iran’s citizens could seize with a minimum of outside assistance.  If Tehran’s ayatollahs are smart, they will dangle endless opportunities for Trump to negotiate, hoping to distract him from more serious, permanent remedies to the threats the ayatollahs themselves are posing.

Of all the critical early tests Trump will face, the Middle East tops the list.  China, Russia, and other American adversaries will be watching just as closely as countries in the Middle East, since the ramifications of Trump’s decisions will be far-reaching.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabie on November 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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What Next in the Middle East?

One year after Hamas launched Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy with a barbaric attack against Israeli civilians, the Middle East has changed significantly.  Now, the world awaits Jerusalem’s response to Tehran’s ballistic-missile attack last week, the largest such attack in history.  It was the current war’s second military assault directly from Iranian territory against Israel, the first being April’s combined drone and ballistic/cruise missile barrage.  We do not know how Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu will respond, but it is nearly certain Israel’s answer will be far stronger than in April.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ring of Fire is clearly failing.  Israel is systematically destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, two critical foundations of Iran’s terrorist power.  Whatever now happens between Jerusalem and Tehran, Iran’s efforts to debilitate Israel —  and potentially the Gulf Arab states  —  with terrorist and conventional military assets may well suffer irreversible defeat.

According to Israel, 23 of 24 Hamas combat battalions have been destroyed, and what’s left remains under attack.  Numerous Hamas leaders have been killed, not the least being Ismael Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in the heart of Tehran.  Yahyah Sinwar remains at large;  Hamas still holds Israeli civilian hostages;  and Gaza’s enormous underground fortress is still partially in Hamas hands, but the ending is increasingly clear.

Hezbollah is still in the process of being destroyed.  Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrullah is already a turning point in Middle East history, so great was the shock in Lebanon and beyond.  As effectively as against Hamas, or perhaps more, Jerusalem is relentlessly decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership, eliminating officials even as they are being promoted to the fill vacancies left by dead colleagues.  Israel also claims to have destroyed half of Hezbollah’s enormous arsenal of missiles and launchers.  That estimate seems high, and in any case leaves significant work remaining against Hezbollah’s estimated  inventory of up to 150,000 missiles.  Nonetheless, with Nasrullah’s demise and with its leadership decimated, Hezbollah is reeling.

The Gulf Arab states and others should now be considering what the future holds for the people of Lebanon and Gaza without Hezbollah and Hamas.  What has been unthinkable for decades may now be within sight.  As long as Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist group, controlled Lebanon and its government, there was no possibility to achieve political freedom and stability.  Given the prospect of Hezbollah’s eradication as both a political and military force, urgent attention is required to the possibility of a society without intimidation and control from Iran.  Lebanon with Hezbollah could and should be a very different place.

Gaza, although smaller, is more complicated.  Palestinians are the only major refugee population since World War II that has not benefitted from the basic humanitarian principle of either returning to their country of origin or being resettled.  Palestinians are, unfortunately for them, the exception, not the norm.  The international community needs to confront the reality that Gaza is not and never will be a viable economic entity, even if some distant day combined as a state with “islands” on the West Bank.  Far better, once Hamas is on history’s ash heap, to treat Gazans more humanely than simply being shields for their terrorist masters.  It makes no sense to rebuild Gaza as a high-rise refugee camp.  The most humane future for innocent Gazans is resettlement in functioning economies where their children have the prospect of a normal future.

Although Gaza and Lebanon have something to look forward to, the same cannot yet be said, sadly, for Yemen, Syria and Iraq.  Yemen’s Houthi terrorists and Iranian-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq remain largely untouched after October 7.  That should change.

Although the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Israel, and Israel has retaliated, the Houthis main contribution to Iran’s Ring of Fire has been effectively closing the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage.  This blockade has been extremely harmful to Egypt through lost Suez Canal transit fees, and has hurt the wider world by significantly increasing shipping costs.  A clear violation of the principle of freedom of the seas, the major maritime powers would be fully warranted to correct it through force, with or without UN Security Council approval.

For the United States, freedom of the seas has been a major element of national security even before the thirteen colonies became independent.  In the last two centuries, America and the United Kingdom led global efforts to defend the freedom of the seas, and should do so now, eliminating the ongoing Houthi anti-shipping aggression.  Cutting off Iran’s supply of missiles and drones is a first step, coupled with destroying existing Houthi stockpiles.  Washington’s opposition to prior efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the terrorists was misguided and should be reversed.  Destroying Houthi military capabilities would afford Yemen the same opportunities now opening for Lebanon and Gaza, and should be urgently pursued.

In Iraq and Syria, as Iran’s power fades (and may well fade dramatically after Israel’s coming retaliation), action against the Iran-backed Shia militias should be the highest priority.  In such circumstances, Baghdad at least may well think twice before demanding that the few remaining US forces still in Iraq and Syria be removed.

For Iran itself, loss of its terrorist proxies, after having invested billions of dollars over decades to build the terrorist infrastructure, will be a dramatic reversal of fortune.  If Iran’s nuclear program is similarly devastated, the threat Iran has posed by seeking to achieve hegemony in the Middle East and within the Islamic world will likely be impossible for the foreseeable future.  In these circumstances, the people of Iran may finally be able to achieve the downfall of the ayatollahs and the creation of representative government.  It is far too early to be confident of such an outcome, but it is not too early to hope for it.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on October 7, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Lasting Middle East peace requires regime change in Iran

October 7, 2023, is truly “a day which will live in infamy,” to borrow Franklin Roosevelt’s memorable description of Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. 

But what Hamas did to innocent Israeli civilians on October 7 and thereafter is the more infamous for its outright barbarity, savagery committed with malice aforethought, the very definition of terrorism.

Stunningly, however, and sadly, many Westerners, one year later, still fail to grasp the full implications of the Iran-Hamas attempted holocaust. 

October 7 initiated Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy against Israel, “the little Satan”. The immediate response from Iran’s Western media and think-tank apologists was to deny Iran’s central role. 

They pointed to US intelligence that elements of Iran’s leadership were unaware Hamas was about to blitz Israel. They argued there was no “smoking gun” evidence of Tehran’s command-and-control over the Hamas terrorists. But even if these assertions are true, they do not refute the logic and reality of Tehran’s responsibility. 

Why should anyone expect that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which takes orders directly from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, would tell anyone who didn’t have an urgent “need to know” what was to happen? The Quds Force and its ilk are not exactly communicative; they are not like US or other Western bureaucracies. Among those quite likely kept in the dark would be Iran’s foreign ministry and even higher authorities. 

Iran’s October 1, 2024, barrage of 180-plus ballistic missiles against Israel corroborates the point that civilian Iranian officials are not in the decision-making loop. The New York Times’s Thomas Friedman reported that day, citing Israeli sources: “The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, was not informed of the attack until shortly before it began, the sources said, indicating that the Iranian regime is divided over the operation, which will probably add to the fractures in the government.” If the President himself was blindsided by the enormously significant second missile attack on Israel, it is no stretch to conclude many were iced out before October 7. 

Nor is the failure of Israeli and other intelligence agencies to uncover an Iran-to-Hamas “execute order” surprising. No Western intelligence agency detected the impending Hamas attack, a massive failure all around. Missing the “execute order” is simply one piece of a more profound intelligence debacle. 

This history is critical. It helps explain, although certainly does not justify, the larger Biden administration failure, shared by all European governments, to react strategically against the real threat: Iran. 

The past year has not been a Palestinian war against Israel, nor an Arab war against Israel. It has been an Iranian war against Israel, fought directly by Tehran’s own military and through its numerous terrorist proxies, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and Iraqi and Syrian Shia militia groups. And behind the terrorist storm troopers lies Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, seeking to produce the world’s most dangerous weapons. This is the ring of fire now directed against Israel, but readily convertible to a ring of fire around the Arabian Peninsula’s oil-producing monarchies. 

The Arab governments at risk are acutely aware of the dangers they face from Tehran. They understand that their strategic assessment is essentially identical to Israel’s, explaining the basis for the Abraham Accords to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. 

Further progress on more Abraham Accords is now on hold for the duration of the conflict, but many believe the possibility of broader recognition of Israel in the Islamic world was what motivated Iran to implement the “Ring of Fire” in the first place. 

One year into the conflict, Israel is doing well. Hamas is nearing complete elimination of its top leadership and organised military capabilities. Hezbollah is well on the way to the same fate. The Houthis, for inexplicable reasons, are still largely untouched, despite their broader threat to the basic principles of freedom of the seas that Britain and America have sought to defend for centuries. 

The blame for failing to destroy the Houthi military capabilities can be laid on US and UK incompetence rather than on Israel. The same applies to Washington’s failure to decimate Shia militias in Iraq and Syria that have repeatedly attacked American civilian and military personnel since October 7. 

Israel’s schwerpunkt, however, has been and undoubtedly remains Iran itself. After this April’s missile-and-drone attack, the Biden administration forced Israel to “take the win” and respond with only one pin-prick strike. That piece of brilliance has obviously failed. Now, Israel is deciding whether to retaliate against Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, oil infrastructure, top leadership, military facilities, or a creative mix-and-match combination. We will know shortly what Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Cabinet decide. 

Israel’s next move is on behalf of everyone in the world who rejects terrorism from Iran, or any other source. We can only wish Jerusalem the best, hoping it encourages the people of Iran to take their fate into their hands, beginning the overthrow of Tehran’s mullahs. 

Whatever Israel does now, the only durable outcome for Iran is ousting the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on October 6, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Israel has exposed the lie at the heart of Starmer and Biden’s foreign policy

Jerusalem’s bold strike at the heart of terror should bring shame to Western states still in thrall to false peace

Hassan Nasrullah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, died on Friday, courtesy of an Israeli air strike. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy, unfolding militarily against Israel across the Middle East since last October 7, has suffered a major setback.  

Jerusalem has already nearly destroyed Hamas’s organised military capabilities in Gaza and, combined with “Operation Grim Beeper” just over a week ago, has repeatedly imposed shock and awe on Hezbollah’s top cadres and infrastructure.  

Since Nasrullah met his maker, Israeli forces have pounded Hezbollah strongholds by air and are readying a ground attack, likely aiming to clear out all terrorist threats south of Lebanon’s Litani River.

Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu flatly ignored President Joe Biden’s pressure not to escalate military action against Hezbollah, and also Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s speech to the United Nations.  

The BBC derided Israel’s efforts, headlining that Netanyahu was trying to “chase victory”  Israel, however, clearly signalled its resolve against Iran, a quality much lacking in recent US and UK policy. Hezbollah and, more importantly, its paymasters in Tehran, should recognize that Israel is determined to do what it takes to establish its security, notwithstanding enormous external pressure.

Also on Friday, Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked US Navy vessels in the Red Sea, the latest example of Iran’s year-long campaign via its Houthi proxies to close the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage to all but friendly vessels. The Houthis openly declared they would support Hezbollah “without limits”. Showing solidarity with its mates, the Houthis again launched missiles against Israel itself.  

These terrorist groups, like their allies Hamas and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, have been armed, equipped, trained and financed by Iran for decades, as part of Tehran’s Ring of Fire strategy. Tehran is now arranging for Moscow to arm the Houthis with anti-ship missiles, evidence of Iran’s growing Russian ties.

Both the White House and 10 Downing Street need to lift their eyes to the strategic level. The barbaric Hamas October 7 attacks constituted but one facet of Iran’s multifront threat against Israel.  

Britain and America once understood what it meant to fight a multi-front war. They did so together successfully in two World Wars, and then again during the Cold War.  

Today, Messrs Biden and Starmer have trouble with this concept. Fortunately, Israel’s leaders do not. For the good of the West as a whole, Israel is now decimating our terrorist enemies in the Middle East.

Although Jerusalem still receives military aid from Washington, London has turned icy, and Biden’s White House is growing more frigid. Neither America’s Secretary of State nor its UN Ambassador attended Netanyahu’s General Assembly speech. And that was before Israel’s strike at Nasrullah.

Despite pro-terrorist propaganda, and the media echo chamber of supporters, the current conflict was never a war of Palestinians against Israeli oppressors. From the start, it has been an Iranian war against Israel.

Failure to grasp this bigger picture, a failure common to the national-security departments and agencies in Washington and London since October 7, persists in their opposition to Jerusalem’s determination to at the very least neutralise the serious terrorist threats it faces.  

Certainly, Israel has made its share of mistakes over the past year, along with the West generally, and can be faulted for allowing the terrorist menace to grow to its present levels.

We have all repeatedly dealt fecklessly with Iran’s efforts to create nuclear weapons. But now that the reality of present danger has become crystal clear, quibbling about Israel’s determination to survive is quite unbecoming to the West’s leaders.

Failed and misbegotten diplomacy toward Iran and Hezbollah particularly has helped produce the current conflict. I know personally because of my service as US Ambassador to the UN during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.

Although the inadequacies of Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought that conflict to a halt, were evident even as the Council was voting unanimously to approve it, recent years have shown it to be wholly ineffective. Resolution 1701’s central objective was to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah after Israel’s devastating retaliation for combined Hamas-Hezbollah attacks from Gaza and Lebanon (sound familiar?).  

To say the least, this UN diplomacy facilitated exactly the opposite result. It did not strengthen an independent Lebanese government, with the backing of enhanced UN peacekeeping forces, to stand against Hezbollah. Instead, Hezbollah in effect took over the Lebanese government.  

As with Hamas in Gaza, not until Hezbollah is eliminated will the truly innocent civilians have a chance for representative government.

Today’s real issue is Iran. Far from being eager to aid now-beleaguered Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran is clearly worried it will face direct, devastating retaliation from Israel. Indeed, there were reports even before Israel’s elimination of Nasrullah that Iran was dodging Hezbollah entreaties for Iran to come to its defence.

Iran has been visibly nervous about responding to Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyah on July 31, and Nasrullah’s exit will only make the ayatollahs more nervous.

The fear that this time Netanyahu will not succumb to American pressure to “take the win,” as Israel did in April after Iran’s unsuccessful missile and drone attack, is clearly chilling Iran’s leadership. As well it should.

While the future is decidedly murky, Israelis undoubtedly remain determined to defend themselves. Too bad the current United Kingdom and the United States governments are not proud to stand with them.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on September 28, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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“If Trump wins, he can make a pact with Maduro. He is a strong man who fascinates him”

The former National Security Advisor in the Trump Administration and ambassador to the UN under George W. Bush inaugurated the FAES 2024 Campus yesterday. Just a few metres from Madrid’s Retiro Park, the veteran foreign policy expert spoke to EL MUNDO about international news, full of “threats”.

This article was first published in Spanish in El Mundo on September 24, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Question: You say that your biggest failure as National Security Advisor to Donald Trump was “not being able to help the people of Venezuela against the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro.”

Answer: I feel that way. True. The conditions in Venezuela are so bad economically and politically that, from a strategic point of view, Maduro could not stay in power if it were not for the support of Russia and Cuba, as well as the intervention of China and Iran. So we have a global problem. We have the troika of tyranny, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, plus other leftist governments in Latin America, which resemble a return to the 1950s and 1960s, again, which is strategically a problem for the United States, but at the same time it is terrible for the people of the American continent.

Q. How do you assess the latest events in Venezuela, with the Spanish government at the epicentre of the exile of the winner of the elections, Edmundo González?

A. Yes. Well… Maria Corina Machado is still inside Venezuela, hiding. So she is still in danger, as are many other opposition leaders. It was a mistake to agree to let Maduro hold elections. He was never going to allow freedom. Maduro began excluding Machado, even from running. And the votes that the electoral officials proclaimed were completely fictitious. It was an exact repeat of the 2019 elections. It was the same thing again. Maduro is doing the same thing.
over and over again. The Biden Administration is completely blind. Sanctions were lifted for a while. Now they have to be reimposed. But the damage is already done. (The) international coalition against the regime has deteriorated and it will be difficult to rebuild it. We don’t know who will win in November in the United States, but Donald Trump has already said recently that Caracas is one of the safest places you can go; that it is safer than many cities in the United States.

Maduro is obviously a strong man for Trump. I remember from my days with him that I was fascinated by the strong man and I don’t know if you’ve read the chapter on Venezuela in my book [The Room Where It Happened], but in the end we managed to get Trump, much to the chagrin of some, not to meet with Maduro. We didn’t let it happen. However, now, it is possible that Trump will make a deal with him. That would be a big setback.

Q: So do you think it is better for Venezuelans if Kamala Harris wins the November 5 election?

A: Well, I don’t think we know anything about her position on Latin America. The best prediction I can make is that, during the first year of a Harris Administration, she will follow the trajectory of the Biden Administration, because that’s what she’s been sitting in National Security Council meetings for for three and a half years.

Q: You say you will not vote for Donald Trump, but neither will you vote for Kamala Harris, and in the 2020 elections you announced that you were going to write Ronald Reagan on the ballot.

A: I thought about writing Ronald Reagan in 2020, but then I also thought that people might think it was too much even for a protest vote. So I wrote in Dick Cheney. Because I wanted to vote for a conservative Republican and there wasn’t one on the ballot. Trump has no philosophy [of government]. He doesn’t think in political terms like most political leaders. Think in terms of what benefits Donald Trump. So what he does in a second term is much harder to predict than people think because the circumstances are different.

Q. And what decision can you take with NATO? You are very pessimistic on this issue…

A. Yes, I think Trump can withdraw the US from NATO. He was very close to leaving. And we’ll see what happens in Ukraine between now and the election and, if Trump wins, between the election and Inauguration Day. I’m very worried. I’m worried that if Trump wins, Putin can call him the day after the election and say, ‘Congratulations, Donald, I’m very glad you were elected. The Biden administration has been a disaster. Why don’t we just get together and resolve all our problems? ‘ And Trump can easily say, ‘As soon as I’m inaugurated, you’ll be the first person I meet with.’

Q. That would be a serious problem for Europe…

A. A Trump Administration doesn’t understand alliances. It’s not just with NATO; Trump doesn’t understand the alliance with Japan; he doesn’t understand the alliance with South Korea… One of the first fights he got into as president was with one of our two closest allies: Australia.

Q. And what about the European position on the Middle East, sometimes so distant, as in the case of the Spanish Government, from the United States’ staunch defense of Israel?

A. It’s hard for most Americans to understand. Support for Israel is overwhelmingly strong among both Democrats and Republicans, although there are many Democrats on the left of the party who take a more pro-Palestinian stance: on college campuses, among American Muslim communities, and on the radical left of the Democratic Party; which is important. I think Europe is making a big mistake. He is buying into the propaganda about who is responsible for the Gaza tragedy. Obviously it is Hamas. If Hamas had not taken billions of dollars to build its underground fortress, that money could have been used for economic development, for the citizens of Gaza, and yet they did not benefit from it at all. Absolutely it is barbaric and cynical the way Hamas is using the Palestinian people to protect itself, and that all this is done at the behest of Iran.

Q. Your tough stance towards Tehran is unwavering…

A. The Tehran regime is the main threat to peace and security in the Middle East and I think, unfortunately, that until that regime is gone and the Iranian people have the opportunity to take control of their own government, there will be no peace and security, because in the meantime it is using a network of terrorist groups. We don’t know what will happen in Lebanon with Hezbollah, but the Israelis live in fear of it. Hezbollah has a missile capacity that can overwhelm Israeli defenses if thousands of missiles are put into the air at once. No air defense system can withstand it. Israeli population centers are very vulnerable.

Q. Your support for Israel is tenacious, but is it also for Benjamin Netanyahu and the war he is waging?

A. Netanyahu has become strong within Israel and I believe that the vast majority of Israelis really want him to eliminate the terrorists. I support the right to self-defense, which includes eliminating your opponent, and Hamas is an opponent, Hezbollah is an opponent. People say, ‘Can’t the war in Gaza end?’ The answer is yes: Hamas could surrender.

Q. What role does China play for you in the complex geopolitical landscape? In Europe, for example, there is still a desire to maintain a bridge with Beijing.

A. Europe has become very dependent on the Chinese market. This is a significant
difference from the Cold War, when Russia had almost no economic connection with Europe or the United States. But the Chinese use this economic connection to in their own interest and people should take that into account. In the United States, companies are not making new capital investments in China. They are looking for alternatives. South Koreans are not investing their money in China either.

The place that is out of date is Europe. And that puts Europe at greater risk. It has also been difficult to convince European governments. Companies like ZTE and Huawei are a threat, and they are not just telecoms companies, they are arms of the Chinese state, designed to take over fifth- generation telecommunications so they can get all the information they want. This is unprecedented in history: using commercial companies in this way, as intelligence arms.

Q. Are we Europeans then naive?

A. Everyone has misjudged China. The US didn’t fully appreciate the threat from Huawei and ZTE until the Australians and New Zealanders sounded the alarm, explained it to us, and fortunately we realised they were right. We then went to the British and told them our whole intelligence-sharing relationship could be in jeopardy. They didn’t believe us, although they do now. Then we tried to talk to the Europeans, on the continent, where we’re having mixed success.

Q. And yet Europe must fear the Chinese connection with Russia…

A. Like South Koreans, the Japanese, and the Taiwanese… who are seeing that same connection between China and Russia.

Q. What do you think of the peace plan that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is about to present?

A. Zelensky hopes to demonstrate with his peace plan that Ukraine is flexible.
But he may be making a mistake in trying to be too reasonable, because Putin is not going to be.

Q. This week the United Nations General Assembly is being held in New York and you are the author of the famous phrase…

A: ‘if the UN headquarters in New York lost 10 floors today, no one would notice.’

Q. That’s it. Do you really think it’s not worth it? Will what is happening and discussed these days in New York mean anything?

A. The United Nations is a large and complex organization, and that is part of its problem. But several of its specialized agencies do very important work: the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Telecommunication Union, the International Maritime Organization,
the World Health Organization (WHO)… They all do a good job when they are not politicized, and in the case of the WHO, for example, we could see how Chinese influence and politicization affected them during Covid. The problem with the UN is that its political decision-making bodies are paralyzed and irrelevant. The General Assembly does almost nothing. And the Security Council is broken by vetoes from Russia and China. The real reason the UN was created was political. It was the answer to the failed League of Nations. It was supposed to stop World War III, but the fact that we haven’t had a World War III has had nothing to do with the United Nations. It’s had to do with the West prevailing in the Cold War. Now it’s going to stop World War III.

We are going to have… I don’t like to call it a second Cold War… it is a very different circumstance… it is a Sino-Russian axis that is a reality. So in the Security Council we are going to have the United Kingdom, France and the United States on one side, and China and Russia on the other.

Q. Let’s end with the future of the Republican Party to which you have dedicated so many years of work since you were in the Reagan Administration. What awaits the political party whether Donald Trump wins or loses?

R. A fight is going to break out in the Republican Party whether Trump wins or not. Let’s say he loses… As I said, Donald Trump has no philosophy, he doesn’t do politics, there is nothing he can pass on to his successors, apart from his style and his way of acting, which is a performing art. So there is no Trumpism. Because Trumpism is what he decides on a given day. After this fight, the Republican Party can return to a Ronald Reagan style, to that kind of party in a few years. If Trump wins, the fight will be greater, because he will be in the White House. But it must be remembered that Donald Trump will become a lame duck the very day he is sworn in, since he will not be able to run for president of the United States again. And that is a very different circumstance than the one he faced in his first term, where he had an eight-year runway.

Potentially, you now only have a fixed term of four years, which goes by very quickly.

This article was first published in El Mundo on September 24, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Operation Grim Beeper

Israel’s stunning attacks on Hezbollah via exploding pagers and walkie-talkies demonstrate both the creativity and cunning of its intelligence and defense forces, and their capacity to strike deep into the heart of its adversaries’ domains.  The casualties among Hezbollah’s top leadership (and allies, like Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon) plus the significant near-term degradation of Hezbollah’s internal command-and-control, make it conspicuously vulnerable.

For Americans, the death of senior Hezbollah leader Ibrahim Aqeel is especially significant.  He was responsible for the 1983 bombings of the US embassy in West Beirut, and of barracks for US Marines and French soldiers participating in a multilateral peacekeeping force, at the government of  Lebanon’s invitation.  At least partial justice has been done.

Together with the recent elimination of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyah in a supposedly secure compound in Tehran, Israel has almost certainly unnerved Iran, its principal enemy, as well as the terrorist proxies directly targeted.  While the future is uncertain, now is a perfect opportunity for Israel to take far more significant reprisals against Iran and all its terrorist proxies for the “Ring of Fire” strategy.  Iran’s nuclear-weapons program may now finally be at risk.

Where does the Middle East battlefield now stand?

After “Operation Grim Beeper,” as many now call it, Jerusalem launched major strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.  Whether these strikes have concluded, or whether they are the opening phases of a much larger anti-terrorist efforts, is not clear.  These and other recent kinetic strikes have caused further damage to Hezbollah’s leadership and its offensive capacity.

Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s extraordinary arsenal of missiles, largely supplied or financed by Iran, plus their ground forces and tunnels networks in the Bekka Valley and elsewhere in Lebanon, make it a continuing threat, more dangerous near-term to Israel than even Iran. The CIA publicly estimates the terrorists could have “as many as 150,000 missiles and rockets of various types.”  Many believe it is a matter of simple self-preservation that Israel must neutralize Hezbollah before any significant military steps are taken against Iran itself.

Since October 8, the day after Hamas’s barbaric attack on Israel, Hezbollah’s constant missile and artillery barrages into northern Israel have forced approximately 60,000 citizens to evacuate their residences, farms and businesses.  Because of the extensive economic dislocation, and the continuing danger of further destruction of the abandoned properties, on September 16, Israel declared that returning those forced to flee from the north to be a national war goal.  That could well signal further strikes.  Israel has maintained near-perfect operational security for nearly a year;  no one on the outside can predict with certainty what is coming.

As for Hamas, a less-reported but equally significant development is that the Biden administration seems to have largely given up hope of negotiating a cease-fire in the Gaza conflict, at least before November’s presidential election.  In fact, Israel and Hamas had opposing goals that could not be compromised.  Israel was prepared to accept a brief cease fire and releasing some Palestinian prisoners, in exchange for its hostages, whereas Hamas wanted a definitive end to hostilities, with all Israeli forces withdrawing from Gaza.  Almost certainly, there was never to be a meeting of minds.

Accordingly, Israel’s  pursuit of Hamas’s remaining top leadership and the ongoing efforts to degrade and destroy its combat capabilities will continue.  Moreover, operations to destroy Hamas’s extraordinarily extensive fortifications under Gaza will also continue, aimed at totally destroying every cubic inch of the tunnel system.  Thus, at least for now, Iran’s initial sally in the Ring of Fire strategy is on the way to ignominious defeat.  Tehran’s dominance in Gaza has brought only ruin.

By contrast, Yemen’s Houthi terrorists, with Iran’s full material support and political direction, continue to close the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage to most traffic, while also targeting US drones in international airspace.  This blockage us causing significant economic hardships.  In the region, Egypt is suffering major declines in government revenue from lost Suez Canal transit fees, which can only increase economic hardships for its civilian population.  Worldwide, the higher costs of goods that must now be transported around the Horn of Africa are burdening countless countries, all with impunity for the Houthis and Iran.

Allowing Tehran and its terrorist proxies to keep these vital maritime passages closed is flatly unacceptable.  Even before the United States was independent, freedom of the seas was a key principle of the colonies’ security.  As with many other aspects of Iran’s Ring of Fire strategy, the Biden administration has been wringing its hands, not taking or supporting decisive  action to clear these sea lines of communication.  Whether the next US President continues the current ineffective approach will obviously not be known until after January 20, 2025.

Similarly, the United States has failed to exact significant retribution against Iran and the Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, also largely armed and equipped by Iran, that have conducted over 170 attacks on American civilian and military personnel since October 7.  The Biden administration has effectively left these diplomats, soldiers and contractors at continuing risk, especially as tensions and increased military activity in the Ring of Fire area of operations escalate.  An Iranian or Shia militia attack that inflicted serious American casualties, which is unfortunately entirely possible due to the Biden administration’s passivity, could prompt major US retaliation, perhaps directly against Iran.

Tehran’s mullahs remain the central threat to peace and security in the Middle East.  As its terrorist surrogates are steadily degraded, and the Ring of Fire Strategy increasingly unravels, the prospects for direct attacks on Iran’s air defenses, its oil-and-gas production facilities, its military installations, and even its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs steadily increase,  Moreover, as Iran’s deeply discontented civilian population sees increasingly that the ayatollahs are more interested in religious extremism than the welfare of their fellow citizens, internal dissent  against the regime will increase.  The real question, therefore, is whether Iran’s Islamic Revolution will outlast its current Supreme Leader.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on September 24, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Effects of the Haniyah Assassination

Ayatollah Khamenei should increase his security protections.  Whoever assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in Iran’s supposedly secure capital sent an unmistakable message to Khamenei, Iran’s citizens, its terrorist proxies, and the world at large:  No one is safe in Iran.  

Not the Supreme Leader, not Qassem Soleimani, and not the lowliest Basiji militiaman.  This grim reality should lead all Iranians not lost in religious fanaticism or authoritarian ideology to reconsider their own future under the mullahs.  Whether Israel (or whomever did the deed) used a bomb planted two months before detonating during Haniyeh’s visit, or fired a precision-guided weapon, the result was the same.  Haniyeh is dead, and Iran stands humiliated.

What now?  Almost a month after Haniyeh’s demise, Iran has not retaliated, although Israel’s pre-emptive August 25 strike against Hezbollah may have thwarted part of Iran’s plan.  The situation remains fluid.  The United States, committed to defend Israel, had acted earlier, deploying the USS Abraham Lincon carrier strike group to the Middle East, overlapping with the USS Theodore Roosevelt group before it returned home.  Also now on station is the nuclear-powered USS Georgia, a cruise-missile submarine.  Together with already present American military capabilities, this is a force to be reckoned with, offensive and defensive.  Its presence alone could be delaying Iran’s response(https://www.wsj.com/opinion/israel-iran-u-s-force-pentagon-biden-administration-gaza-hamas-dcf393a1?mod=opinion_feat1_editorials_pos3).

While no one can ignore a US carrier strike group in their backyard, the main cause for Iran’s hesitation in again attacking Israel, as it did on April 13 with 320 missiles and drones, is the decidedly unpleasant strategic conundrum it faces.  Humiliated, presumably by Israel, the mullahs must undertake devastating reprisals to reestablish credibility and deterrence.  This time, a pinprick attack on Israel, which is all Hezbollah’s Sunday attack amounted to, will not suffice.  

Moreover, some observers are dubious about Iran’s April strike, asserting that it warned Israel in advance, thereby enabling Israel’s defenses to blunt the assault.  In turn, in President Biden’s words, Jerusalem could “take the win” and respond minimally.  This analysis is speculative, and there are reports Iran suffered massive failures in its ballistic-missiles launches(https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-launches-drone-attack-toward-israel-idf-says/).  Whichever version is true, Iran caused only minimal casualties and physical damage.  That will not be nearly enough this time, whether the response comes from Iran itself, Hezbollah, or another terrorist proxy.  

However, a truly punishing attack is what creates Iran’s strategic conundrum.  Iran fears that an emboldened Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not bend to Washington’s pressure this time, as he did in April.  With Biden now a lame duck, and the US presidential election in doubt, Israel could conclude that this is precisely the moment to launch a debilitating response, not just take out a few missile-launching sites.  To start, Jerusalem could level Iran’s air-defense capabilities.  Then, Netanyahu could target Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs;  its oil terminals and loading facilities in the Gulf;  or major IRGC and regular military facilities countrywide.  This time, the Supreme Leader might also be a target.

If Israel caused serious damage, the entire 1979 Islamic Revolution could be in jeopardy, which the ayatollahs will not want to risk.  Their hold on power domestically has never been so unsteady, with substantial, long-brewing political, economic, and social discontent.  Wrestling with the competing imperatives of striking Israel savagely but not being overthrown is paralyzing the regime’s decision-making.  Trying to make a virtue out of necessity, Tehran claims to be withholding revenge to avoid jeopardizing the Qatari-led effort to establish a Hamas-Israel cease-fire in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages.  With the negotiations seemingly stalled, the mullahs welcome further delay, not out of altruism for the combatants in Gaza, but because it affords Tehran precious additional time to untangle its strategic dilemma.  

If the cease-fire negotiations do collapse, Iran will have no satisfactory way to escape the unpleasant alternatives it faces.  That is a problem of its own making, having forged its “ring of fire strategy” against Israel over decades, and for reasons still unclear, launching it with Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack.  Tehran may have miscalculated the effect of Hamas’s blitz, which clearly did not crush Israel’s resolve.  Instead, Netanyahu is now close to achieving his stated goal of eliminating Hamas’s political and military capabilities.  

Moreover, with chaos in Gaza so extensive, Israel can now reopen the decades-old issue of what to do next with Gazan civilians, and whether resettlement to third countries is now in order.  Following World War II, tens of millions of refugees who, for whatever reasons, could not return to their home countries were resettled.  Only Palestinian were exempted from this outcome, treated instead as hereditary refugees, weapons against the very existence of Israel.  That already-obsolete plan met its demise thanks to the Iran-Hamas October 7 assault.

Iran could choose to do very little, hoping its reputation as a regional power with nuclear capabilities will not suffer greatly.  Its terrorist surrogates, however, will then question the basic terms of their dependence on Iran.  If the ayatollahs can’t protect terrorist leaders in Tehran, what are their incentive to do Tehran’s bidding in a dangerous and uncertain future?  Might not Tehran’s timidity inspire Iran’s domestic opposition?  Seeing weakness externally, might not the regime’s domestic enemies conclude that their moment to oppose the legitimacy and very existence of the mullahs’ regime is at hand?

The clock is ticking for the ayatollahs.  They do not have forever to decide.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on September 26, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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What Netanyahu’s visit showed about the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to America last week reflected long-term pluses and minuses for the U.S.-Israel relationship. The historical relationship between Israel and the Democratic Party hit its lowest point ever, while that between Republicans and Israel has never been stronger. Driving these developments are tectonic shifts of power and demographics among Democrats and, even more importantly, tectonic shifts in Israeli public opinion about how to achieve lasting peace and security.

Netanyahu’s address to a joint session of Congress echoed both alterations. His Gaza objectives were clear: “Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and its rule in Gaza and bring all our hostages home. That’s what total victory means, and we will settle for nothing less.”

The prime minister rightly laid responsibility for the threats facing Israel on Iran, the principal menace to Middle Eastern stability. This reality has still not sunk in with Democrats, particularly in the Biden White House. In Israel today, whatever Netanyahu’s personal popularity, there is little debate on these points.

America’s core national interest in supporting Israel against Iran and its terrorist surrogates is more than religious, historical and cultural. Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats both currently manifest themselves in the Hamas war against Israel, the “little Satan,” but Tehran also targets America, the “great Satan.” Gaza is not the main battleground, but merely one front of Tehran’s threat, which Netanyahu spelled out clearly, yet again. And yet again, the Democratic establishment didn’t get it. Fortunately for Israel, most Americans do.

Netanyahu’s meeting with President Biden was apparently workmanlike, focusing on Biden’s continuing, misbegotten pursuit of a cease-fire-for-hostages deal between Hamas and Israel. Ominously for Netanyahu, however, Biden has already moved far away from the “ironclad” support for Israel he pledged shortly after Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7 attack. Inevitably, the leaders’ meeting reflected the unrelenting, unprecedented pressure the White House has put on Jerusalem to end the Gaza conflict.

When still a candidate for reelection, Biden wanted the Middle East (and Ukraine) off the front pages, hoping to conceal the spreading global chaos caused by his own foreign policy’s grave weaknesses. Biden also wanted to avoid offending tender Iranian or Russian sensitivities, lest increased global oil prices reignite inflation, thereby diminishing his waning chances of victory in November. Although Biden is now a lame duck, his and Vice President Kamala Harris’s interests still converge on this point.

For Israel, Biden truly is a transitional president, the last vestige of President Harry Truman’s pride that the U.S. was first to recognize Israel’s independence. Those days are over. As Netanyahu said to Congress, Biden described himself as “a proud Irish-American Zionist.” Vice President Harris is not a proud Zionist of any variety, which, if not already clear, became so in her Netanyahu meeting, evidenced by her frosty manner and both her public and private remarks.

Afterward, Harris said, “let’s get the deal done so we can get a cease-fire to end the war.” Easy to say if eliminating Hamas’s threat (let alone Iran’s) isn’t your foundational objective. But Harris wasn’t finished. She proclaimed that she would “not be silent” about suffering Gazans, although if suffering Gazans were her true concern, she would be pressuring Hamas, not Israel.

Hamas, after all, turned Gaza into an underground fortress at the expense of its civilians, whom it has used ruthlessly as human shields. Failing to acknowledge this reality effectively endorses a terrorist veto against Israel’s right of self-defense. Let Harris explain that during the campaign’s final 100 days.

The Democrats’ split with Israel mirrors Britain’s new Labour Party government. Labour has a long, disturbing history of antisemitism and doubtful support for Israel, and once again disdains the Jewish state. Last week, Prime Minister Keir Starmer pleased Labour’s hard left by lifting U.K. objections to the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and others. Another question for reporters to ask Harris: Does she support Biden’s continuing opposition to the warrants?

Netanyahu’s meeting with Donald Trump was no picnic either. The day before, Trump said, “I want him to finish up [in Gaza] and get it done quickly. They are getting decimated with this publicity. Israel is not really good at public relations, I’ll tell you that.” It suits Trump politically to pretend that his personal relationship with Netanyahu was always good, and the meeting provided Trump an excellent opportunity to recall his presidency’s pro-Israel decisions, like moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The risk underlying these comments, like similar Trump remarks recently, is not abstract concern about Israel losing the propaganda war with Iran and Hamas. Instead, Trump fears that his pro-Israel stance is now bringing him political costs rather than benefits, which is not how Trump thinks the world should work. His interests alone dictate his political positions, so Israel needs to shape up and stop troubling his already difficult presidential campaign.

Post-visit, Netanyahu and Israel have a better picture of the troubling tendencies of America’s three most important political leaders before Election Day. Whether Harris or Trump wins, Jerusalem’s relations with Washington will be more difficult. This is not the road America should be on, but these are the candidates we have, and one of them will prevail in November.

This article was first published in The Hill on July 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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The New Iranian President and Donald Trump

Masoud Pezeshkian probably never expected to become Iran’s President, nor did most of his countrymen, nor the outside world.  Whatever the reasons for his success, Pezeshkian’s victory means only that Tehran now shows a smiley face to foreigners rather than a mean face.  Beneath surface appearances, nothing substantive has changed.

Westerners especially have long misunderstood that Iran’s elected Presidency does not hold decisive political power, certainly not on Tehran’s critical national-security priorities like nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and supporting innumerable terrorist groups.  Ayatollah Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, like his predecessor and father of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini.  “Supreme Leader.”  That title tells you everything.

Elections for Iran’s presidency are hardly free and open.  To start, only candidates satisfactory to the Guardian Council may run, and the Council has never been slack in applying rigid ideological standards.  The races are ultimately never more than hardline-hardliners running against moderate-hardliners.  If the Guardian Council had wanted to exclude Pezeshkian from the election, they could have.  If they wanted to ensure he lost, they could have allowed multiple “moderates” in the race and only one “hardliner.”  Instead, they did the opposite, and Pezeshkian prevailed.  If the regime had really been worried about such an outcome, it would simply have stolen the election, as in 2009.  Interestingly, voter turnout figures remain hotly disputed, so we may never know exactly how many people legitimately cast ballots.

Until the regime finally issues a definitive statement on why Pezeshkian’s predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, died in a helicopter crash, questions about regime stability will linger.  Whatever the cause of the crash, Pezeshkian is an accidental President.  For Raisi, the presidency may well have been but a steppingstone, given Khamenei’s age and infirmities.  He had been fingered by the Supreme Leader and others as potentially Iran’s third Supreme Leader upon Khamenei’s death or incapacity.  Pezeshkian, by contrast, seems to be a temporary fill-in, even more of a figurehead than other Presidents, until the key ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard decide how to proceed.

Over 45 years, Iran’s two Supreme Leaders, through successive presidencies, have never deviated from their fundamental national-security precepts:  (1) pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile delivery capabilities;  and (2) creating and enhancing multiple terrorist proxies across the Middle East and globally.  These have been foundational both to Tehran’s hegemonic regional ambitions and its broader aspirations for dominance in the Islamic world.  No mere substitute President is going to obstruct that strategic vision.

What Pezeshkian does for the mullahs is to provide what Russians call “maskirovka”:  camouflage that disguises Iran’s real foreign policy.  Like other puppets and front men Tehran has used over the years, including former Foreign Minister Javid Zarif and Hossein Mousavian, a former nuclear negotiator now nestled comfortably at Princton, Pezeshkian is a walking, talking disinformation campaign.  Susceptible Westerners, longing for resumed nuclear talks with Iran, now have a straw to grasp at.  Nothing will come from any resumed diplomacy, of course, because there is no sign Iran the Supreme leader has made a strategic decision to change course.

Ironically, therefore, the mullahs have scored a public-relations coup by having an empty suit like Pezeshkian replace Raisi, widely called “the butcher of Tehran” for his judicial role in ordering executions of hundreds (perhaps thousands) of political prisoners.   If Pezeshkian chooses to attend the UN General Assembly opening in New York this September, one can imagine the welcome America’s credulous media and academic institutions will afford him.  He smiles, he waves, he acts informally, perhaps he likes progressive jazz, maybe he drinks a little Scotch whiskey in private (who knows!), he must want to make a deal the United States!

US liberals and the Biden Administration can dream about this scenario, but they may not be in office after November’s election.  Even if they were, of course, the compliant Pezeshkian they imagine would not be making nuclear-weapons policy, nor would his Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, chief negotiator of the 2015 nuclear deal.  Americans are all too apt to succumb to the diplomatic phenomenon known as “mirror imaging,” where negotiators look across the table and see people just like themselves:  reasonable men and women simply looking to find practical solutions to shared problems.  That’s exactly opposite from how the Islamic Revolution views the outside world.

Instead, if Donald Trump wins, now more likely than ever after the failed July 13 assassination attempt, his propensity to treat national-security issues simply as opportunities for making deals could lead to a Trump-Pezeshkian get-together.  French President Emmanuel Macron almost seduced Trump into meeting with Zarif on the margins of the Biarritz G-7 in August, 2019.  Trump’s “zeal for the deal” brought him within an eyelash of seeing Zarif, and foreshadows a contemporary version of that meeting early in a new Trump term.  It may take second place to Trump visiting North Korean leader Kim Jung Un in Pyongyang to reopen nuclear negotiations, but it suits Trump’s singular focus on personal publicity.

Thus, while Pezeshkian’s election as President may not have been conscious Iranian maskirovka, there is no doubt the Supreme Leader and his cohorts can take advantage of the opportunity presented if they so choose.  Such circumstances do not mean a new nuclear deal would emerge, since that would certainly not be Tehran’s negotiating objective.  Instead, the mullahs would be playing for more time, which is uniformly beneficial to would-be nuclear proliferators, hoping to achieve a nuclear-weapons capability, and then to decide how to employ it.  The same would be true for Iran’s terrorist objectives in the region and beyond.  Trump would not even realize he was playing according to the Supreme Leader’s script.

Although the unsuspecting Masoud Pezeshkian may not realize it, he may be exactly the gift the ayatollahs never thought to ask for.

This article was first published in the Independent Arabia on July 16, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Biden Goes to Extremes to Appease Tehran

The world has truly turned upside down when a U.S. president begs America’s allies to have a United Nations agency go easy on a terrorist nuclear proliferator. The Biden administration’s reported pleading on behalf of Iran isn’t merely a tactical error about yet another biodegradable U.N. resolution. It’s a persistent strategic blindness that existentially threatens key U.S. partners and endangers our own peace and security.

Iran’s largely successful effort to conceal critical aspects of its nuclear-weapons complex from scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western intelligence services is nearing culmination. IAEA reports about Iran’s uranium-enrichment program—and Tehran’s disdain for IAEA inspections, extending over two decades—finally have the Europeans worried.

Instead of welcoming this awakening, President Biden is reportedly lobbying European allies to avoid a tough anti-Iran resolution at this week’s quarterly IAEA board of governors meeting. The administration denies it. But limpness on Iran’s nuclear threat fits the Obama-Biden pattern of missing the big picture, before and after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, including cash-for-hostages swaps with Iran as recently as last year.

Mr. Biden has two objectives. The first is to keep gasoline prices low and foreign distractions to a minimum before November’s election. The second is the Obama-Biden obsession with appeasing Iran’s ayatollahs, hoping they will become less medieval and more compliant if treated nicely. Both objectives are misguided, even dangerous.

Election worries about gas prices have also weakened U.S. sanctions against Russia, which are failing because of their contradictory goals. It simply isn’t possible to restrict Russian revenue while keeping U.S. pump prices low. The ayatollahs don’t worry about elections, but they know weakness when they see it, including Mr. Biden’s relaxed enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil exports.

Mr. Biden’s greater mistake is refusing to acknowledge Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy to intimidate Israel and achieve regional hegemony over the oil-producing monarchies and other inconvenient Arab states. The foundational muscle for achieving these quasi-imperial aspirations is Iran’s nuclear program, precisely the issue at the IAEA. Starting in his 2020 campaign, Mr. Biden repeatedly alienated Gulf Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, which felt particularly threatened by his zeal to rejoin the failed 2015 nuclear deal. Mr. Biden’s willingness to exclude Israel and the Arabs from negotiations with Tehran, as Mr. Obama did, convinced Arab governments that Washington was again hopelessly feckless. Israel concurred.

Arab leaders privately see the need to eliminate Tehran’s terrorist proxies. Saying so publicly, however—even quietly—requires political cover, which Washington has failed to provide. The Biden administration could have sought to destroy, not merely inhibit, the Iran-backed Houthis’ capacity to close shipping routes in the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Since the U.S. failed to do so, rising prices from higher shipping costs increase the risk of a de facto Iran-Houthi veto over freedom of the seas. Not surprisingly, Iran now threatens to blockade Israel itself.

Mr. Biden decided to concentrate world attention on Gaza rather than on Iran as the puppet-master. Doing so has helped obscure that Gaza is only one component of the larger ring-of-fire threat. Many Israelis, including several members of the war cabinet, have long focused on the close-to-home threat of Palestinian terrorists rather than the existential threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. This joint failure enabled Tehran’s propaganda to outmatch Jerusalem’s, leaving the false impression of a moral equivalence.

Had the U.S. and Israel explained the barbarity of Oct. 7 in such broader strategic terms, they would necessarily have concentrated attention on Iran’s coming succession crisis. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is old and ailing. President Ebrahim Raisi’s still-unexplained demise has already launched a succession struggle that could transform Iran. The U.S. and its allies should help the Iranian opposition fracture the Islamic Revolution at the top. Instead, Mr. Biden, who couldn’t conceive of overthrowing the ayatollahs, has dispatched envoys to beg Iran not to stir things up further before November.

Sending Tehran what diplomats call a “strong message” from the IAEA isn’t much, but treating Iran as if it calls the shots is far worse. Praying that Mr. Biden wakes up to reality may be the world’s only hope.

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on June 4, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

ABOUT JOHN BOLTON

Ambassador John Bolton, a diplomat and a lawyer, has spent many years in public service. He served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 2005-2006. He was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005. In the Reagan Administration, he was an Assistant Attorney General.