Presidents Expect Loyalty. Trump Demands Fealty.

Posted on January 6, 2025 by jloft

Four years ago this Monday, Donald Trump pressured Mike Pence to pursue a surreal interpretation of the vice president’s constitutional role in counting the Electoral College’s votes. Mr. Pence refused, igniting Mr. Trump’s fury for not subordinating either philosophical or constitutional principles in service to him, thereby showing “disloyalty.” Thus ended Mr. Pence’s usefulness to Trumpworld, albeit honorably for Mr. Pence.

Now Mr. Trump is selecting key personnel for his second term. Although the prospective appointees vary in philosophy, competence and character, one requirement for them is unfortunately consistent: the likelihood that they will carry out Mr. Trump’s orders blind to norms and standards underlying effective governance, or perhaps even to legality.

Mr. Trump’s obsessiveness stems purportedly from an unhappy first term, when too many senior advisers were not “loyal” to him. These officials had separate agendas, Mr. Trump’s advocates say, undermining, frustrating, even reversing the president’s decisions, thereby illegitimately usurping his power. Such usurpers were considered denizens of the “deep state,” Republicans in Name Only, conspiratorially linked by a desire to cripple Mr. Trump’s presidency. Not this time, say his consiglieri, notably his eldest son; they want only loyalists.

But what exactly is “loyalty” in the executive branch, and indeed in Congress, where senators have a constitutional advise-and-consent role regarding significant numbers of (but not all) senior officials? To most citizens, loyalty is rightly seen as a virtue. Indeed, a major tenet of first-term veterans of Mr. Trump’s administration is that they did what was customary, which was to swear loyalty to our Constitution, not the man. Former officials like Mark Esper and Mark Milley have persuasively made precisely this point, which the Trump transition team conveniently ignores, fearing correctly that asserting personal over constitutional loyalty would produce nuclear-level blowback.

In fact, Mr. Trump, whose understanding of the Constitution is sketchy, really wants his appointees to display fealty, a medieval concept implying not mere loyalty but submission. Berating and demeaning cabinet officials before their colleagues, as he did to Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, among others, and then keeping them in office is both disturbing and yet typical for Mr. Trump. At Britain’s 2023 coronation of King Charles, Prince William pledged that he would be his father’s “liege man of life and limb.” That’s fealty, publicly affirmed, the kind of personalist link that Mr. Trump expects will elide constitutional obligations.

This is indisputably damaging to a free society, but it is a well-established Trump habit. Neither kings nor presidents, nor their countries, are well served if they are surrounded by sycophants and rent-seekers. Truly strong presidents are not afraid of advisers with strong views.

At his first formal cabinet meeting in June 2017, with the media present, Mr. Trump solicited his team’s praise, something even old Washington hands could not recall having seen.

In the current transition, potential Trump appointees say they have been asked whether they believe the 2020 election was stolen (to which there is only one right answer, one contrary to fact) and how they view the events of Jan. 6, 2021. (When Mr. Trump finally leaves the political scene, it will be interesting to see how many nominees claim they actually never believed he won in 2020 or that Jan. 6 was an innocent walk in the park, not an unlawful riot.) Kissing Mr. Trump’s ring to gain the highest government ranks is one thing, but the real crunch for the new appointees, especially those without prior government experience, will come after they actually begin work. That is one reason the Constitution checks the president’s appointment power.

The framers strove to make their Constitution lasting. They were not naïve. They had lived through “times that try men’s souls.” Alexander Hamilton, for example, saw the Senate’s advice-and-consent role in the most practical terms. As he wrote in Federalist 76, the idea that the president “could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body would be forced and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members; but that the necessity of its cooperation in the business of appointments will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate.”

Asking the Senate to perform as Hamilton envisioned is not hard. Recently, 38 House Republicans dealt Mr. Trump his first legislative loss as president-elect by defeating a continuing resolution he backed. Surely senators are at least as independent as House members.

How does fealty work in office? This is the real test of appointees’ personal integrity, evidencing whether their loyalty is to the Constitution or to Mr. Trump. In the Defense Department, for example, where military officers are obligated not to follow illegal orders, what happens if Mr. Trump orders a domestic deployment that violates the Posse Comitatus Act? Will Pete Hegseth, whom Mr. Trump has chosen to be the secretary of defense, urge rescinding the order or just pass it along to the armed services? Will uniformed officers, perhaps advised by government lawyers, demur? How deep into the chain of command could this chaos extend, and what lasting damage might it cause?

Analogous illegal orders could cause significant crises across the intelligence community, which is considered the dark heart of the deep state by many, Mr. Trump among them. But the federal departments and agencies most at risk are law-enforcement agencies, especially the Justice Department. If Mr. Trump orders that the nominee for attorney general, Pam Bondi, prosecute Liz Cheney for potential subornation of perjury before the House’s Jan. 6 committee, what will Ms. Bondi do? She could say there is no prohibition on members of Congress encouraging witnesses to tell the truth in legislative hearings and no evidence that Cassidy Hutchinson or other witnesses perjured themselves.

Or Ms. Bondi could instruct Mr. Trump’s pick for deputy attorney general, Todd Blanche, who represented the president-elect in several criminal cases, to investigate not only Ms. Cheney but also Ms. Hutchinson and other witnesses. Mr. Blanche will be an interesting test case. He is a former federal prosecutor. He knows the rules. Will he uncritically follow Ms. Bondi’s order, at the risk of his own legal ethics and possible disciplinary action from the bar association? If Mr. Blanche passes the order down to the assistant attorney general for the criminal or national security division, or directly to the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, what then? And once presented to career trial attorneys, what will they do, with their own professionalism at stake? All these questions and decisions also apply to F.B.I. staff members and other investigators, who will face scenarios comparable with those at the Justice Department.

As a result, there could be a Justice Department in continuing crisis. Whatever happens there and at other agencies, however, I believe the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts, and especially the trial courts, will not long tolerate the sort of malicious prosecutions Mr. Trump is considering in his retribution campaign. The example of district court judges in the District of Columbia, whether appointed by Republican or Democratic presidents, handling Jan. 6 defendants is instructive, especially their sentencing decisions. They may not all have been like Watergate’s “Maximum John” Sirica, an appointee of President Dwight Eisenhower, but they were tough. There’s nothing like the judiciary’s life tenure, compared with serving “at the pleasure of the president for the time being.”

Of course, just the cost of legal representation during investigations or prosecutions can be daunting, especially since Mr. Trump will be using tax dollars if he decides to wage lawfare against political opponents. He may not be expending his personal resources, but his targets will. Nor will they have the extent of official immunity that presidents have, criminally or civilly, something for office seekers to think about in advance.

Mr. Trump’s appointees should carefully note his expertise in escaping the consequences of his actions, whereas his loyal supporters often do not. Ask Michael Cohen and Rudy Giuliani.

This was first published in the New York Times on 1/5/25 HERE

Trump can turn Syria opportunity against Iran

Posted on January 6, 2025 by jloft

Last month’s rapid collapse and fall of Syria’s Assad dynasty surprised the world, starting with Bashar Assad himself. Led by the radical Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al Sham and likely galvanized by Israel’s mauling of Hamas and Hezbollah, the rebel victory represents Iran’s third catastrophic defeat in trying to implement its anti-Israel “ring of fire” strategy.

HTS and its leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, are struggling to consolidate power within long-fractured Syria. Their main priority is convincing Arab and Western states that they are no longer terrorists, nor controlled by Turkey, which labels HTS as terrorist but has nonetheless aided it for years. Sharaa has shed his terrorist nom de guerre and even his combat fatigues, now appearing at media events in Western attire. Whether his transformation from radical terrorist is real or merely cosmetic remains to be seen.

Still, this is no time for the United States to say “hands off.” We have two critical national security interests flowing from Assad’s downfall. First, cooperating with Israel and Arab allies, we must ensure that Syria does not become another terrorist state, threatening our regional allies and possibly Europe and America. Second, Washington and Jerusalem should seize the opportunity of swiftly moving events in the Middle East to increase pressure on Iran, including destroying or substantially weakening its nuclear weapons program.

On the antiterrorism front alone, the U.S. has compelling reasons to prevent another Afghanistan. Nearly 2,000 of our troops remain in northeastern and eastern Syria, supporting primarily Kurdish forces who helped eliminate the Islamic State territorial caliphate in 2019, and who are now guarding thousands of dangerous Islamic State fighters held prisoner. The Kurds are threatened not only by HTS but by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations, long-standing irredentist objectives in northern Syria, and his vindictive campaign against the Kurdish people. Northeastern Syria is today relatively calm. Any U.S. withdrawal or assent to Turkish demands to “relieve” us would only contribute to longer-term instability.

Inside the remainder of Syria, numerous ethnic and religious minorities, some favored under Assad, some not, worry about their fate under radical Sunni Islamist rule, as possibly dangerous as the Shia Hezbollah terrorists in next-door Lebanon. The disorder in Syria compounds the already widespread fragmentation created during the Arab Spring struggle to overthrow Assad. These anarchic conditions are conducive for existing and newly arriving foreign terrorists to establish a significant presence in Syria, as in Afghanistan, which would pose substantial dangers regionally and globally.

For Washington, the possibility that HTS might push Russia out of its naval and air stations at Tartus and Hmeimim, respectively, is a major upside. HTS has reportedly called for all Russian forces to withdraw. Widespread reporting indicates that some removals of troops and equipment are underway, perhaps slowed by the sinking of a Russian cargo ship in the Mediterranean, which Moscow blames on terrorism. But if HTS did, in fact, expel the Russian military from Syria, that could be promising evidence that HTS wanted to foster stability and reject adventurism by unhelpful foreign assistance.

As to Iran, Assad’s overthrow substantially damaged its hegemonic ambitions, and not just in Syria. By cutting off land supply routes to Hezbollah in Lebanon, HTS severed the most efficient, economical route used by Tehran for years to supply its terrorist proxy. HTS has warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria,” which, typically, Iran denied doing.

Israel wasted little time after Assad fled to Moscow, attacking Syrian air, land, and naval military facilities; chemical and biological weapons targets; and temporarily occupying the entire U.N. Golan Heights demilitarized zone and some additional Syrian territory. Although criticized pro forma by Gulf Arab states, Israel’s preventive action was justified by Syria’s instability and the risk of terrorists seizing government control in Damascus. Even the Biden administration acted militarily, bombing significant Islamic State targets to prevent its resurgence, or allowing HTS to absorb Islamic State fighters and assets.

With Syrian air defenses degraded, as Iran’s have been by prior Israeli strikes, the way is now largely open from Israel to Iran should Jerusalem and Washington decide to strike the heart of Tehran’s nuclear program. There may never be a better opportunity.

The Biden administration has consistently and erroneously pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to eliminate Iran’s nuclear menace. However, core U.S. national security interests, notably our long struggles against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, all justify eliminating Tehran’s existing capabilities. Diplomacy has manifestly failed.

History is ready for the making in Syria and the Middle East. The incoming Trump administration should go for it.

First Published in the Washington Examiner on 1/6/25 HERE

A U.N. Reform Plan for Trump and Stefanik

Posted on December 27, 2024 by jloft

The new administration should reject mandatory ‘assessments’ and fund only programs that work.

By John Bolton

Elise Stefanik, Donald Trump’s pick for the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has her work cut out for her. Fortunately, she’s already aware of the U.N.’s flaws. In a September op-ed for the Washington Examiner, she applauded Mr. Trump for withdrawing from the “corrupt and antisemitic” Human Rights Council and defunding the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, the U.N.’s permanent refugee organization for Palestinians, during his first term. She also praised House Republicans for voting to sanction the International Criminal Court.

Ms. Stefanik joins a long line of U.S. officials dismayed by the U.N.’s profound failings, including its deep-seated bias against Israel. As one of those officials, my contributions to U.N. reform include implementing President George W. Bush’s decision to remove America’s signature from the treaty establishing the ICC, advising Mr. Bush to vote against creating the Human Rights Council and then doing so, and leading the effort to repeal the U.N.’s infamous “Zionism is racism” resolution. Several years later, in 2018, I recommended that Mr. Trump withdraw from the Human Rights Council and defund Unrwa.

But the job is far from over. No one should underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead or the effort that will be required to achieve real, lasting U.N. reform. A major obstacle is our own State Department. Its bureaucracy historically has been unwilling to do the heavy lifting required to muster support for transforming the U.N. That burden will fall not only on U.S. missions to U.N. components but also on the State Department’s regional bureaus, which are responsible for bilateral relations with the other 192 members. For decades, the regional bureaus have found reasons not to engage, pleading that innumerable bilateral issues be given higher priority. Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio will need to crack the whip for reform to succeed.

The new administration should prove to U.N. members that its goal of reform isn’t merely rhetorical. Washington’s most important weapon will be its wallet—decisions about how much it financially contributes, or doesn’t contribute, to the U.N. Current spending is out of control. In 2022, the most recent year for which we have accurate data, the U.S. contributed more than $18 billion, accounting for roughly one-third of total U.N. funding. As the Heritage Foundation reported, “the U.S. provided more funding to the U.N. system than 185 other U.N. member states combined.” That year we forked over 8.5 times the amount that China, the second-largest donor, contributed.

Funding for U.N. components falls into two categories: mandatory “assessed” contributions and voluntary contributions. Assessments are calculated by opaque “capacity-to-pay” formulas, which have historically made America the largest contributor. After decades of negotiation and congressional legislation, U.S. assessments are currently capped at 22% for most contributions and 25% for peacekeeping operations. On a one-nation-one-vote basis, bodies like the General Assembly decide agency budgets, and members then pay their percentage shares.

Assessments, therefore, amount to international taxation of America by other U.N. members. A majority of member governments tells us what we owe, on pain of losing our vote in U.N. governing bodies if we don’t pay up. That alone is sufficient reason to reject the concept of assessments, since it is not our votes in these bodies that matter. The only vote that does matter is our Security Council vote (and veto), our main shield against one-nation-one-vote majorities U.N.-system-wide. Our permanent seat in the Council and its vote are written into the U.N. Charter, and we can veto changes to the Charter. The potential negative consequences of ending assessed contributions, then, are essentially nil.

U.N. bureaucrats, U.S. officials and nongovernmental organizations assert without evidence that America gets enormous credit for its contributions to the U.N. and warn that America’s influence would diminish worldwide if those contributions were significantly reduced or eliminated. These assertions are false. Special-interest advocates simply take our current level of funding for granted, complain that it’s inadequate and demand more. It’s time they get their comeuppance.

The U.N. Charter doesn’t require assessed contributions. The Charter says merely that the organization’s expenses shall be “apportioned by the General Assembly,” but requires no specific approach. The Assembly could make contributions entirely voluntary, as is the case already with some U.N. agencies and programs. The Trump administration simply needs to resolve against the U.N. system’s longstanding reliance on assessments until the totally voluntary approach prevails and other members acquiesce.

Shortly after taking office, Mr. Rubio and Ms. Stefanik should announce that the U.S. no longer accepts the concept of assessed contributions. Henceforth, we will pay only voluntary contributions, which we will decide by evaluating the performance of each U.N. agency and program. We may zero out some programs; we may voluntarily fund others at or near our current assessed level; and we may even increase funding for others. But we will decide. And every other U.N. member will have the same prerogative.

This approach rests on the revolutionary assumption that we fund the U.N. based on its performance, paying only for what we want and insisting that we get what we pay for. U.N. agencies that are funded entirely by voluntary donations, such as the World Food Program, generally tend to outperform those funded by assessments. Because they have to prove their worth annually, they have an incentive to sustain and even boost their performance. If voluntarily-funded programs fail or falter, we should reduce their funding accordingly. Ultimately, some agencies will prove unreformable, and America should simply withdraw from them. The U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization immediately comes to mind, as it did for President Ronald Reagan, who withdrew the U.S. from UNESCO in 1984. The country later rejoined in 2003 under Mr. Bush, although Mr. Trump withdrew in his turn, and Joe Biden rejoined. Doubtless, Mr. Trump will withdraw again—and rightly so—during his second term.

Using America’s money as an existential threat will rock the U.N. system. While many other reforms are possible, they won’t match the power of unilaterally controlling our contributions. Besides, we need a much larger defense budget; reducing contributions to the U.N. is a good start to find the necessary funding.

First Published in the Wall Street Journal on December 26th here

Assad’s fall: the beginning of major changes or new threats?

Posted on December 17, 2024 by jloft

The fall of the regime in Syria confuses the calculations of Russia and Iran and reshapes the regional balances in the Middle East.

History is moving fast in the Middle East, raising the possibility, for well or ill, of
massive changes throughout the region. The collapse of Syria’s Assad-family dictatorship took
everyone by surprise, starting with Bashar al-Assad himself, and certainly including Russia and
Iran. Arab and Western intelligence services missed the regime’s vulnerability, particularly the
weakness and disloyalty of its military and security services.

The brutal dictatorship is gone, but what comes next? Most importantly, Assad’s removal
is yet another massive defeat for Iran’s ruling mullahs. Following Israel’s thrashing of Hezbollah
and its near-total dismemberment of Hamas, this is the third major catastrophe for Tehran’s anti-
Israel “ring-of-fire” strategy. While Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu agreed to a cease fire with
Hezbollah, he has made clear it lasts for only sixty days, ending just after the Joe Biden leaves
office. Hezbollah will be in further dire trouble if its overland supply route through Iraq and
Syria is permanently blocked. There is no cease fire with Hamas, meaning both terrorist proxies
could face further Israeli decimation.

As for Iran itself, the situation could hardly be worse. With three major pillars of its
regional power already fallen or on the way, the ayatollahs are now at great risk both
internationally and domestically. Recrminations and finger-pointing among top leaders of the
Revolutionary Guards and regular Iranian military( https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-
news/2024/12/09/iran-armed-forces-at-war-with-themselves-fall-assad-syria/ ) has already spread
widely in the general population( https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/iran-
syria-assad.html ).

Disarray and fragmentation in the senior ranks of authoritarian governments are often the
first signs of regime collapse. Popular discontent in Iran was already extensive due to long-
standing economic decline, the opposition of young people and women generally, ethnic
discontent, and more. If the Revolutionary Guard and regular military leaderships begin to come
apart, the potential for internal armed conflict grows. Assad’s collapse showed that a façade of
strength can mask underlying weakness, with surprisingly swift collapse following.
Externally, Iran’s regime has not been this vulnerable since the 1979 revolution.

Jerusalem has already eliminated Tehran’s Russian-supplied S-300 air-defense systems, seriously
damaged its ballistic-missile capabilities, and destroyed elements of the nuclear-weapons
program( https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-
research-facility ). Netanyahu has never had a better opportunity to obliterate all or vast swathes
of the entire nuclear effort. So doing would make Israel, neighboring states, and the entire world
safe from the threat of Iran’s decades-long nuclear-proliferation threat, which has long
contravened the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel, with US assistance if requested, should go for the win on the nuclear issue. Not
only would that eliminate Tehran’s threat of a nuclear Holocaust, it would simultaneously strike
yet another domestic political blow against the mullahs. In addition to the tens of billions of
dollars wasted in supporting Iran’s now-decimated terrorist proxies, but the billions spent on
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles would also be seen as squandered. Iran’s citizens would
be perfectly entitled to conclude that the ayatollahs had never had their best interests at heart, and
that their removal was now fully justified.

Russia is the next biggest loser. Distracted and overburdened by its unprovoked
aggression against Ukraine, now about to enter its third year, the Kremlin lacked the resources to save its puppet in Damascus. Vladimir Putin’s humiliation is reverberating globally, and it will
also have corrosive impact inside Russia, perhaps finally stimulating more-effective opposition
to the ongoing burdens the Ukraine war imposes on Russia’s citizens and economy.

Even more significant losses may be coming. The Kremlin’s main interests in Syria are
its Tartus naval station and its Latakia air base. These are Moscow’s only military facilities
outside the territory of the former Soviet Union. They are vital to Russia’s position in the eastern
Mediterranean. If forced to evacuate these bases, Moscow’s ability to project power beyond the
Black Sea would be dramatically reduced, as would be the threat to NATO across the
Mediterranean. Although there were early indications Russia might to retain the bases, recent
commercial overhead photography indicates it may be preparing to withdraw some or all of its
forces. The situation remains fluid( https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/13/world/syria-
news ).

Without doubt, Turkey, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorists, and the Turkish-
backed Syrian National Army are the big winners so far. However, Syria’s internal situation is
far from settled. American troops remain in northeastern Syria assisting the largely Kurdish
Syrian Defense Forces in the anti-ISIS campaign, and at al-Tanf. The Kurds should not be
abandoned, especially to President Recep Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations to expand
Ankara’s control and influence in Arab lands It would be a mistake, at this point, to remove HTS
from Washington’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, although, unwisely, the Biden
administration is reportedly considering doing so( https://www.politico.com/news/2024/12/09/us-
debates-lifting-terror-designation-for-main-syrian-rebel-group-00193367 ).

While eliminating Assad is a critical contribution to reducing the Iranian threat, neither
Israel nor neighboring Arab governments nor the United States have any interest in seeing
another terrorist state arise, and this one on the Mediterranean. Delicate diplomacy lies ahead.
In the meantime, Biden was right to bomb ISIS weapons storage depots in eastern Syria to deny
those assets to HTS, and Israel is justified in eliminating the Assad government’s military assets
for the same reason.

Importantly for the region and beyond, urgent efforts are required to locate and secure all
aspects of Assad’s chemical and biological weapons
programs( https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/12/syria-chemical-
weapons-search-mustard-sarin/ ). Assaad used chemical weapons against his own people as
recently as 2017 and 2018, so there is no question whether these capabilities exist.

Thus, while there is considerable good news surrounding Assad’s ouster and exile to
Moscow, circumstances in Syria still pose serious threats to peace and security in the Middle
East and globally. This is no time to relax or turn away, especially for the incoming Trump
administration.

This article was first published on December 17th for Independent Arabia.

Kash Patel Doesn’t Belong at the FBI

Posted on December 10, 2024 by jloft

The President’s constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” requires evenhanded action in the national rather than his personal interest, a distinction Donald Trump does not grasp. His often-stated intention to seek retribution against opponents, if implemented, facially contravenes the Take Care clause.

Too many of Mr. Trump’s personnel selections evidence his assiduous search for personal fealty from subordinates, not loyalty to the Constitution and its Take Care clause. Stocking his administration with lickspittles will benefit him, but not America. Kash Patel’s nomination as FBI Director squarely fits this pattern.

Congressman Devin Nunes pushed Mr. Patel for the National Security Council staff after Republicans lost control of the House in 2018. Notwithstanding Mr. Patel’s utter lack of policy credential, the President ultimately ordered him hired. NSC staff has long been divided into Directorates responsible for different policy areas. Charlie Kupperman, my Deputy, and I placed Mr. Patel in the International Organizations (IO) Directorate, which had a vacancy.

Approximately five months later, an opening arose in the Counter Terrorism (CT) Directorate. The pressure resumed, and so Mr. Patel moved laterally. In neither case was he in charge of a directorate during my tenure as National Security Advisor, or thereafter, as he contends in his memoir, and has repeatedly stated elsewhere. He reported to Senior Directors in both cases, and had defined responsibilities. His puffery was characteristic of the resumé inflation we had detected earlier when he was first pressed upon us. He proved less interested in his assigned duties than in worming his way into Mr. Trump’s presence, which evidenced he was duplicitous, manipulative, and conspiratorial, as the following examples demonstrate.

Fiona Hill, NSC Senior Director for Europe, later testified to Congress during the impeachment hearings that Mr. Patel, at that time assigned to the IO Directorate, participated in a May, 2019, Oval Office meeting on Ukraine, and that he had engaged in various other Ukraine-related activities(https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2019/11/FionaHill-compressed.pdf). Whatever he did on Ukraine while an NSC staffer was unrestrained freelancing. He denies any communication with Mr. Trump on Ukraine(https://www.axios.com/2019/11/09/national-security-council-staffer-denies-secret-ukraine-conversations-trump).

In August, when I was overseas, Mr. Trump called Mr. Kupperman and White House Counsel Pat Cipollone to the Oval Office, finding Mr. Patel already there, to discuss making him an administration enforcer of presidential loyalty. Messrs. Cipollone and Kupperman strongly objected to any such vigilante role, whether in the NSC or the Counsel’s office, and the issue disappeared. I resigned shortly thereafter.

In October, 2020, during a hostage-rescue mission, as former Defense Secretary Mark Esper memoir described, Mr. Patel, then in the CT directorate, misinformed other officials that a key airspace-transit clearance had been granted. In fact, the clearance had not been obtained, thus threatening the operation’s success. Mr. Esper writes that his team “suspected Patel made the approval story up,” but was not certain. Typically, Mr. Patel’s version of this episode in his memoir denies any error, but, ironically, boasts of his acting beyond the authority of NSC staffers. Then-Secretary of State Pompeo also knew the day’s details, including the clearance problem. He has not spoken publicly about the incident. He should.

Last week, Olivia Troye, Vice President Pence’s former counter-terrorism advisor, elaborated on these concerns, tagging Mr. Patel with “making things up on operations” and lying about intelligence(https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14158977/trump-fbi-kash-patel-legal-threat-msnbc-olivia-troye.html). His lawyers responded by threatening to sue her for defamation, writing that “[a]t no point did Mr. Patel ever lie about national intelligence, place Navy Seals at risk, or misinform the Vice president.” Of course, what Mr. Esper and Ms. Troye are accusing Mr. Patel of lying about is the airspace-transit clearance, the lack of which would have made transit by US forces though the airspace of the country in question an act of war.

These are but a few of many cases that touch directly on Mr. Patel’s character, or lack thereof, and his consistent approach of placing obedience to Mr. Trump above other, higher, considerations, like loyalty to the Constitution. His conduct in Mr. Trump’s first term and thereafter shows clearly that his mantra as FBI Director would be Lavrenty Beria’s reported comment to Joseph Stalin, “show me the man, and I’ll show you the crime(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/12/03/patel-deep-state-trump-retribution/).” These are precisely the character flaws, repeatedly displayed, which disqualify him for any senior law-enforcement or national-security role.

Mr. Patel has made numerous statements, many of which he has tried to walk back once they came to wider public attention. He has, for example, frequently called for investigations of journalists(https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/kash-patel-said-come-journalists-now-hangs-fbi-candidacy-rcna182661). He has been accused of seeking to declassify sensitive information for political or personal reasons rather than for legitimate national-security reasons(https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/12/06/kash-patel-trump-fbi-director/). Tellingly, during Mr. Trump’s first term, both Attorney General Bill Barr and CIA Director Gina Haspell(https://www.axios.com/2021/01/16/kash-patel-cia-gina-haspel), respectively, threatened to resign if Mr. Patel were forced upon them as their deputy.

Mr. Trump argues he was unfairly, even illegally, targeted by partisan Biden prosecutors. His opponents believe this is false. The dispute is irresolvable in this brief article. What is true, is that if illegitimate partisan prosecutions were launched, those responsible should be held accountable in a reasoned, professional manner, not in a counter-witchhunt.

The worst response is for Mr. Trump to engage in precisely the prosecutorial conduct he so roundly condemns. Simply making the threats politicizes and degrades the legal process and people’s faith in even-handed law enforcement. A President possessed of civic virtue would not launch retribution against opponents, and he would certainly not appoint an FBI Director who saw himself solely as the President’s liege man. That kind of President would never consider Mr. Patel. If Mr. Trump is determined, wrongly, to remove Chris Wray, there are previous examples to follow that have restored faith in a battered Justice Department and FBI. In 1975, President Ford selected University of Chicago Law Dean Edward Levi as Attorney General, and in 1978, President Carter named Judge William Webster, a Republican, to be FBI Director.

Mr. Patel is no Ed Levi or Bill Webster. To resolve disagreements over his integrity and fitness, a full-field FBI investigation, as prior nominees have undergone, is clearly warranted. With more facts available and less rhetoric, the result will be clear. I regret I did not fully discern Mr. Patel’s threat immediately. I might have, to borrow Winston Churchill’s phrase, strangled his Trumpian-servility in its cradle. But we are now all fairly warned. Senators will not be able to escape history’s judgment if they vote to confirm him.

–

During 1985-89, Mr. Bolton was Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legislative Affairs and then of the Civil Division at the Justice Department. He is the author of “The Room Where It Happened.”

This article was first published in WSJ on December 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Dark days lie ahead with Trump on the world stage once more

Posted on December 2, 2024 by jloft

Donald Trump’s looming inauguration bodes poorly for vital Western security interests, and Ukraine in particular. Trump’s hostility to NATO is palpable, and his feelings about Ukraine follow close behind. After January 20, US military and economic assistance will likely drop significantly, and negotiations with Russia begin quickly. In turn, European financial support for Ukraine will diminish, as EU members rush to revive now-defunct commercial ties with Moscow. Despite contrary press reports, Trump has not yet spoken to Vladimir Putin. When they do, Trump’s desire to put this “Biden war” behind him could, at worst, mean capitulation to maximalist Russian demands. After all, if assisting Ukraine’s defense against unprovoked aggression is unimportant to Washington, why worry about Kyiv’s terms of surrender?

In fact, core American national interests remain. Since 1945, European peace and stability have been vital to advancing US economic and political security. The ripple effects of perceived American and NATO failure in Europe’s centre will embolden Beijing to act aggressively toward Taiwan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and along its land borders. These aren’t abstract, diaphanous worries at the periphery of our interests, but hard threats to US physical security, trade, travel and communications globally.

Biden put these interests at risk by bungling implementation of nearly three years of aid to Kyiv. He never developed a winning strategy. His administration helped create the current battlefield gridlock, deterred by constant but idle Kremlin threats of a “wider war.” Parcelling out weapons only after long public debates prevented their most effective use. Biden failed to explain clearly Russia’s threat to key Western interests, thereby fanning the belief there are no such interests, and abetting the Trump-inspired isolationism spreading nationally.

What to do? Aiding Ukraine is in NATO’s vital interest. That interest does not diminish because of persistent Biden administration poor performance. Do we ignore the continuing reality that Russia’s aggression threatens Alliance security? Does Ukraine simply give way to Trumpian capitulationism?

Certainly not. In the coming negotiations, certain points are essential to any potential agreement. The following suggestions, which are hardly my preferred outcome, are the absolute minimum we must obtain. They are only indicative, not exhaustive, and certainly not NATO’s opening position.

Any agreement must be explicitly provisional to keep Ukraine’s future open. Moscow will treat any deal that way regardless. For the Kremlin, nothing is permanent until its empire is fully restored, by their lights. Putin needs time to restore Russia’s military capabilities, and believing any “commitment” to forswear future aggression against Ukraine is dreaming.

A ceasefire along existing military frontlines during negotiations may be inevitable. Nonetheless, we should insist that any ultimate agreement explicitly state that the lines eventually drawn have no political import whatever, but merely reflect existing military dispositions. Russia may later disregard such disclaimers, but such claims must be rendered clearly invalid in advance.

Similarly, the agreement should not create demilitarized zones between Ukrainian and Russian forces inside Ukraine, or along the two countries’ formal border elsewhere. The surest way for a ceasefire line to become a permanent border is to make it half-a-mile wide, extending endlessly through contested territory. A DMZ inures solely to Moscow’s benefit.

Deployments of UN peacekeepers have an unhappy history of freezing the status quo, not helping to resolve the underlying conflict. Consider the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has partitioned the island since 1964. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled the Golan Heights since 1974, and may last forever, but did not prevent Israel from annexing the Golan. The list goes on. In Ukraine, a disengagement force could mean permanent cession of twenty percent of Ukraine to Russia.The problem is not mitigated if the peacekeepers are under NATO rather than UN auspices. It is not the quality of the military that makes a difference, but the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Does anyone doubt what Russia’s long-term aims are? Or Ukraine’s for that matter? My guess is that the Kremlin won’t agree to NATO peacekeepers anyway, at least not unless augmented by thousands of North Korean troops.

Finally, Ukraine should not be constrained in its future options to join or cooperate with NATO. What’s left of Ukraine will still be a sovereign country, striving for representative government, and free to pick its allies on its own. We should not acquiesce in enforced neutralization, what in the Cold War was called “Finlandisation”. Even Finland turned out not to like it, finally joining NATO in 2023. And if some hardy nations want to provide security guarantees to Free Ukraine, they should be able to do so, not subject to Russian vetoes.

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal.

This article was first published in the Telegraph UK on November 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Trump and Iran

Posted on November 11, 2024 by jloft

Donald Trump’s election as President guarantees that America’s Middle East policy will change. The real question, though, and a major early test for Trump, is whether it will change enough. Does he understand that the region’s geopolitics differ dramatically from when he left office, and could change even more before Inauguration Day? The early signs are not promising that Trump grasps either the new strategic opportunities or threats Washington and its allies face.

The region’s central crisis on January 20 will be Iran’s ongoing “ring of fire” strategy against Israel. Right now, Israel is systematically dismantling Hamas’s political leadership, military capabilities, and underground Gaza fortress. Israel is similarly dismembering Hezbollah in Lebanon: its leadership annihilated, its enormous missile arsenal steadily decimated, and its hiding places shattered. Israel will continue degrading Hamas, Hezbollah, and West Bank terrorists, ultimately eliminating these pillars of Iranian power. Even President Biden’s team has already urged Qatar to expel Hamas’s leaders(https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/politics/qatar-hamas-doha-us-request/index.html).

Unfortunately, Yemen’s Houthis, still blocking the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage, have suffered only limited damage, as have Iran’s Shia militia proxies in Syria and Iraq. Iran itself finally faced measurable retaliation on October 26, as Israel eliminated the Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and inflicted substantial damage on missile-production facilities. Nonetheless, Iran’s direct losses remain minimal. Due to intense White House pressure and the impending US elections, Jerusalem targeted neither Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program nor its oil infrastructure.

Whether Israel takes further significant action before January 20 is the biggest unknown variable. Israel’s October 26 air strikes have prompted unceasing boasting from Tehran that it will retaliate in turn. These boasts remain unfulfilled. The ayatollahs appear so fearful of Israel’s military capabilities that they hope the world’s attentions drift away as Iran backs down in the face of Israel’s threat. If, however, Iran does summon the will to retaliate, it is nearly certain this time that Israel’s counterstrike will be devastating, especially if during the US presidential transition. Israeli Defense Forces could lay waste to Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs so extensively they rock the foundations of the ayatollahs’ regime.

Washington’s conventional wisdom is that Trump will return to “maximum pressure” economically against Iran through more and better-enforced sanctions, and stronger, more consistent support for Israel, as during his first term. If so, Tehran’s mullahs can relax. Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” policy was nothing of the sort. Even worse, a Trump surrogate has already announced that the incoming administration will have “no interest in regime change in Iran(https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-envoy-says-trump-aims-to-weaken-iran-deal-of-the-century-likely-back-on-table/),” implying that the fantasy still lives that Trump could reach a comprehensive deal with Tehran in his second term.

Moreover, despite the staged good will in Bibi Netanyahu’s call to Trump last week, their personal relationship is tense. Trump said in 2021, “the first person that congratulated [Biden] was Bibi Netanyahu, the man that I did more for than any other person I dealt with. Bibi could have stayed quiet. He has made a terrible mistake(https://www.axios.com/2021/12/10/trump-netanyahu-disloyalty-fuck-him).” In practice, this means that Israel should not expect the level of Trump support it received previously. And, because Trump is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, he need not fear negative domestic political reactions if he opposes Israel on important issues.

Much depends on the currently unclear circumstances Trump will face on January 20. In addition to shunning regime change, Trump seems mainly interested in simply ending the conflict promptly, apparently without regard to how(https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-erratic-foreign-policy-meet-a-world-fire-2024-11-06/), which has proven very effective in US politics. This approach is consistent with his position on Ukraine. Asserting that neither conflict would have even occurred had he remained President, which is neither provable nor disprovable, Trump sees these wars as unwanted legacies from Biden.

If Israel does not demolish Iran’s nuclear aspirations before Trump’s inauguration, those aspirations will be the first and most pressing issue he faces. If he simply defaults back to “maximum pressure” through sanctions, he is again merely postponing an ultimate reckoning with Iran. Even restoring the sanctions to the levels prevailing when Trump left the Oval Office will be difficult, because Biden’s flawed and ineffective sanctions-enforcement efforts have weakened compliance globally. Trump will not likely have the attention span or the resolve to toughen sanctions back to meaningful levels. The growing cooperation among Russia, China and Iran means Iran’s partners will do all they can to break the West’s sanctions, as they are breaking the West’s Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia.

As they say in Texas, Trump is typically “all hat and no cattle”: he talks tough but doesn’t follow through on his rhetoric. Since he has never shown any inclination to move decisively against Iran’s nuclear program, that leaves the decision to Israel, which has its own complex domestic political problems to resolve. An alternative is to assist Iran’s people to overthrow Tehran’s hated regime. Here, too, however, Trump has shown little interest, thereby missing rare opportunities that Iran’s citizens could seize with a minimum of outside assistance. If Tehran’s ayatollahs are smart, they will dangle endless opportunities for Trump to negotiate, hoping to distract him from more serious, permanent remedies to the threats the ayatollahs themselves are posing.

Of all the critical early tests Trump will face, the Middle East tops the list. China, Russia, and other American adversaries will be watching just as closely as countries in the Middle East, since the ramifications of Trump’s decisions will be far-reaching.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabie on November 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

North Korea comes to Europe: How will the next president respond?

Posted on October 30, 2024 by jloft

The threat of North Korea fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine is no longer a nightmare, but a real possibility. Two weeks ago, Kyiv said Pyongyang’s soldiers were already in Ukraine and had sustained casualties. Now the Biden administration has confirmed that 10,000 North Korean troops are training in Russia, adding that they will be “fair game” if deployed to Ukraine.

As Election Day approaches, voters should worry whether either Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump are awake to and able to handle this immediate danger and its longer-term implications.

Having Pyongyang’s forces fighting in Ukraine would both bolster Moscow tactically and provide those troops with battlefield experience, greatly benefitting them in future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the risk that, in return, the Kremlin supplies Kim Jong Un with nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile technology — if it hasn’t already — directly imperils South Korea, Japan and deployed U.S. forces in the region.

By contrast, in 2018, Trump canceled regular U.S.-South Korean “war games” to please Kim, thus compromising allied combat readiness. In a tense environment, where the U.S.-South Korean troops’ preparedness mantra is “Fight Tonight,” this is crucial.

There is no sign that Trump understands his mistake. And Harris’s thoughts on Pyongyang’s menace appear to be a blank slate.

South Korea is hardly standing idly by. Having previously sold tanks, artillery and ammunition to Poland, President Yoon Suk Yeol is currently considering selling weapons to Ukraine. Additionally, Pyongyang’s growing closeness to Moscow, and fears of Washington’s fecklessness, will only increase Seoul’s ongoing debate about whether to acquire an independent nuclear-weapons capability. We are well into uncharted territory.

The broader threat is not just North Korea but the emerging China-Russia axis, now widely understood as a reality, not a prediction. While similar in appearance to the Cold War’s Sino-Soviet alliance, today’s version differs dramatically: China this time is inarguably the dominant partner. The axis is far from fully formed. Disagreements and tensions clearly exist, notably over Pyongyang’s increasing affinity for Russia, as Kim emulates his grandfather Kim Il Sung’s uncanny ability to play Moscow off against Beijing.

Contemporaneously with Kim and Vladimir Putin locking step, the Kremlin is also reportedly supplying Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis with targeting data, thereby augmenting its campaign to effectively close the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage (other than to “friendly” vessels like Russian tankers). Thus, notwithstanding its problems and quirks, the axis and its outriders are rolling along.

Worryingly, however, one variety of America’s contemporary isolationist virus, epitomized by vice presidential nominee Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), holds that the Middle East and Europe should be downgraded as U.S. priorities in order to focus on China’s threat in Asia, particularly against Taiwan. This menace is indeed real, but far wider than just endangering Taiwan or East Asia generally. While not yet comprehensive or entirely consistent internally, the Beijing-Moscow hazard is worldwide.

Worst of all, the latest manifestation of Beijing’s sustained, aggressive military buildup is the new projection that China’s nuclear-weapons arsenal will reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, much earlier than previous predictions. Increasing Chinese nuclear capabilities portend a tripolar nuclear world, one radically different and inherently riskier and more uncertain that the Cold War’s bipolar U.S.-USSR faceoff.

This is not simply a new U.S.-China problem. All our assessments about appropriately sizing America’s nuclear deterrent, allocating it within the nuclear triad (land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, plus long-range bombers), along with all our theories of deterrence and arms control, were founded on the basic reality of bipolarity. Impending tripolarity means that all those issues need to be reconceptualized for America’s security, not to mention the extended deterrence we provide our allies.

Do we face one combined China-Russia nuclear threat, or two separate threats? Or both? The questions only get harder. This is not an Asia-based risk, but a global one, inevitably implying substantial budget increases for new or rehabilitated nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Responding to North Korea with yet another four years of “strategic patience” — the Obama and Biden do-nothing policy — is both wrongheaded and increasingly dangerous. As for China, focusing on securing bilateral climate-change agreements, Biden’s highest priority, is wholly inadequate. Even where his administration acted strategically — enhancing the Asian Security Quad, endorsing the AUKUS nuclear-submarine project, agreeing to trilateral military activity with Japan and South Korea — Biden demonstrated little sense of urgency or focus.

Surely the image of Pyongyang fighting Kyiv should jar both the simplistic premises of “East Asia only” theorists and the quietude of Biden-Harris supporters. We must immediately overcome any remaining French and German objections to increasing NATO coordination with Japan, South Korea and others, including ultimately joining NATO, as former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar suggested years ago. Existing Asia-based initiatives like the Quad, AUKUS and closer military cooperation among America’s allies need to be rocket-boosted.

We need a president who understands the importance of American leadership and has the resolve to pursue it. Let’s pray we get one.

This article was first published in The Hill on October 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

A Biden-Starmer Giveaway Helps China

Posted on October 16, 2024 by jloft

As a one-term president, Joe Biden appears eager to take actions he might not have taken if he had to worry about getting re-elected. The latest example: He apparently pushed the U.K. to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean to the island country of Mauritius. The Chagos archipelago is unremarkable but for one key fact: Diego Garcia, its largest island, houses a critical U.S.-U.K. military base near the Indian Ocean’s geographic center point.

British media report that U.S. officials, fearing that existing International Court of Justice rulings and a potential push in the United Nations General Assembly would pose political problems, pressured British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to cede them on Oct. 3. Whatever Mr. Starmer’s motivation—whether to appease Mr. Biden or lessen guilty feelings about imperial history—the decision was utterly misguided.

The Chagos “problem” hasn’t figured prominently in British politics before now, except in certain Labour Party circles. Jeremy Corbyn, Labour’s leader before Mr. Starmer, obsessed over the issue, long a priority for Labour’s Trotskyite wing. Worried about disapprobation by biased global courts, the White House and State Department during Mr. Biden’s term fell in sync with Britain’s Corbynites.

Under the deal, Diego Garcia will remain under British jurisdiction for at least 99 years. The site is home to a critical U.S. military facility, fittingly nicknamed the “footprint of freedom.” The island will only become more important to U.S. resistance against China’s efforts to achieve hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

Mauritius, meantime, is increasingly China-friendly. China is its top trading partner, and Beijing has used debt-trap diplomacy—lending with strings attached—to ensnare the island nation. If the British Parliament approves transferring the Chagos to Mauritius, China will be able to maneuver ships and planes near Diego Garcia for intelligence-gathering and military operations. Given Beijing’s history of militarizing comparable tiny landmasses in the South China Sea, the threat is clear.

China has long conducted extensive undersea surveys of the Indian Ocean, ostensibly for commercial reasons but obviously in pursuit of maritime dominance. A Beijing presence in the Chagos will facilitate these efforts, posing a direct threat to India, which it appears wasn’t consulted by either Whitehall or Foggy Bottom.

There’s no compelling logic for ceding the islands to Mauritius. That the Chagos are associated with Mauritius is actually a fluke of colonial administration: France was Mauritius’s first colonial European power, governing the islands from the larger chain after taking control in the early 1700s. Britain acquired Mauritius after victory in the Napoleonic Wars and continued France’s governing mode. Many alternative solutions for the islands are available, but neither Washington nor London have shown an appetite for considering them.

The U.S. faced analogous challenges in ending its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or TTPI, during the 1980s and ’90s. Once German colonies, the islands became a Japanese mandate under the League of Nations, and, after 1945, a U.N. trusteeship under U.S. control. One part of the TTPI, the Northern Marianas, became an American commonwealth. Three others—Palau, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia—chose independence but entered into Compacts of Free Association with the U.S., giving Washington authority over their foreign and security policies.

For all the overblown rhetoric about a British “diplomatic success,” it seems no one bothered to ask Chagossians their views. Given Mauritius’s prior poor treatment of Chagossians, Chagossians might have preferred to have become a U.S. commonwealth.

China has already tried to take advantage of Washington’s inattention in the former TTPI by aggressively pressing its interests and intentions and using debt-diplomacy tactics. Although Washington is now pressing back against Beijing, we can’t afford to make similar mistakes in the Chagos or the broader Indian Ocean.

Messrs. Biden and Starmer have checked the Chagos Islands off Mr. Corbyn’s to-do list. Let’s hope there aren’t any other foreign-policy surprises in Mr. Biden’s remaining lame-duck period.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on October 16, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

What Next in the Middle East?

Posted on October 7, 2024 by jloft

One year after Hamas launched Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy with a barbaric attack against Israeli civilians, the Middle East has changed significantly. Now, the world awaits Jerusalem’s response to Tehran’s ballistic-missile attack last week, the largest such attack in history. It was the current war’s second military assault directly from Iranian territory against Israel, the first being April’s combined drone and ballistic/cruise missile barrage. We do not know how Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu will respond, but it is nearly certain Israel’s answer will be far stronger than in April.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ring of Fire is clearly failing. Israel is systematically destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, two critical foundations of Iran’s terrorist power. Whatever now happens between Jerusalem and Tehran, Iran’s efforts to debilitate Israel — and potentially the Gulf Arab states — with terrorist and conventional military assets may well suffer irreversible defeat.

According to Israel, 23 of 24 Hamas combat battalions have been destroyed, and what’s left remains under attack. Numerous Hamas leaders have been killed, not the least being Ismael Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in the heart of Tehran. Yahyah Sinwar remains at large; Hamas still holds Israeli civilian hostages; and Gaza’s enormous underground fortress is still partially in Hamas hands, but the ending is increasingly clear.

Hezbollah is still in the process of being destroyed. Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrullah is already a turning point in Middle East history, so great was the shock in Lebanon and beyond. As effectively as against Hamas, or perhaps more, Jerusalem is relentlessly decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership, eliminating officials even as they are being promoted to the fill vacancies left by dead colleagues. Israel also claims to have destroyed half of Hezbollah’s enormous arsenal of missiles and launchers. That estimate seems high, and in any case leaves significant work remaining against Hezbollah’s estimated inventory of up to 150,000 missiles. Nonetheless, with Nasrullah’s demise and with its leadership decimated, Hezbollah is reeling.

The Gulf Arab states and others should now be considering what the future holds for the people of Lebanon and Gaza without Hezbollah and Hamas. What has been unthinkable for decades may now be within sight. As long as Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist group, controlled Lebanon and its government, there was no possibility to achieve political freedom and stability. Given the prospect of Hezbollah’s eradication as both a political and military force, urgent attention is required to the possibility of a society without intimidation and control from Iran. Lebanon with Hezbollah could and should be a very different place.

Gaza, although smaller, is more complicated. Palestinians are the only major refugee population since World War II that has not benefitted from the basic humanitarian principle of either returning to their country of origin or being resettled. Palestinians are, unfortunately for them, the exception, not the norm. The international community needs to confront the reality that Gaza is not and never will be a viable economic entity, even if some distant day combined as a state with “islands” on the West Bank. Far better, once Hamas is on history’s ash heap, to treat Gazans more humanely than simply being shields for their terrorist masters. It makes no sense to rebuild Gaza as a high-rise refugee camp. The most humane future for innocent Gazans is resettlement in functioning economies where their children have the prospect of a normal future.

Although Gaza and Lebanon have something to look forward to, the same cannot yet be said, sadly, for Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Yemen’s Houthi terrorists and Iranian-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq remain largely untouched after October 7. That should change.

Although the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Israel, and Israel has retaliated, the Houthis main contribution to Iran’s Ring of Fire has been effectively closing the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage. This blockade has been extremely harmful to Egypt through lost Suez Canal transit fees, and has hurt the wider world by significantly increasing shipping costs. A clear violation of the principle of freedom of the seas, the major maritime powers would be fully warranted to correct it through force, with or without UN Security Council approval.

For the United States, freedom of the seas has been a major element of national security even before the thirteen colonies became independent. In the last two centuries, America and the United Kingdom led global efforts to defend the freedom of the seas, and should do so now, eliminating the ongoing Houthi anti-shipping aggression. Cutting off Iran’s supply of missiles and drones is a first step, coupled with destroying existing Houthi stockpiles. Washington’s opposition to prior efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the terrorists was misguided and should be reversed. Destroying Houthi military capabilities would afford Yemen the same opportunities now opening for Lebanon and Gaza, and should be urgently pursued.

In Iraq and Syria, as Iran’s power fades (and may well fade dramatically after Israel’s coming retaliation), action against the Iran-backed Shia militias should be the highest priority. In such circumstances, Baghdad at least may well think twice before demanding that the few remaining US forces still in Iraq and Syria be removed.

For Iran itself, loss of its terrorist proxies, after having invested billions of dollars over decades to build the terrorist infrastructure, will be a dramatic reversal of fortune. If Iran’s nuclear program is similarly devastated, the threat Iran has posed by seeking to achieve hegemony in the Middle East and within the Islamic world will likely be impossible for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the people of Iran may finally be able to achieve the downfall of the ayatollahs and the creation of representative government. It is far too early to be confident of such an outcome, but it is not too early to hope for it.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on October 7, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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